The TTP Resurgence and the Limits of Pakistan's Afghan Leverage

The most significant negative shift in Pakistan’s security environment since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power in Kabul is the resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Attacks on security forces, concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, have risen to levels not seen in years. Islamabad’s core grievance — that the TTP operates with sanctuary on Afghan soil — has hardened into the central irritant in the bilateral relationship.

Why leverage is limited. Pakistan’s traditional instruments of pressure on Kabul are blunter than they appear. Border closures at crossings such as Torkham and Chaman disrupt Afghan transit trade, but they also hurt Pakistani traders and inflame local populations on both sides. The expulsion of Afghan refugees is a powerful signal but a humanitarian and reputational liability. Kinetic options — cross-border strikes — generate tactical effect and strategic blowback in roughly equal measure, and they have not changed the Afghan Taliban’s calculus.

The Taliban’s calculus. Kabul has its own constraints. The Afghan Taliban share ideological and tribal ties with the TTP and cannot move decisively against it without internal cost. They also resent being treated as Pakistan’s security subcontractor after years in which Islamabad was the patron. The result is a relationship in which Pakistan’s expectations and Afghanistan’s willingness are structurally misaligned.

The economic crossfire. This security friction has direct economic consequences. The Afghan transit trade, smuggling of dollars and goods, and border commerce are all hostage to the security relationship. Repeated closures raise costs, disrupt legitimate trade, and push activity into informal channels — complicating the very fiscal and currency stabilisation Islamabad is pursuing elsewhere.

Outlook. We expect continued high militant tempo, episodic border closures, and periodic Pakistani strikes, without a durable resolution. The conditions for a breakthrough — a Taliban government both willing and able to constrain the TTP, and a Pakistani government willing to offer something in return — are not present. For firms with exposure to the northwest and to Afghan-linked trade, this is a structural risk to price in, not a passing flare-up.